Why Trump Waived Russia Sanctions That Threatened 100 Percent Tariffs on India and China

Why Trump Waived Russia Sanctions That Threatened 100 Percent Tariffs on India and China

Washington almost blew up global energy trade with a single deadline. Then, on October 16, 2026, President Donald Trump signed an executive order that pulled the plug on those penalties just two days before they were supposed to kick in.

That executive order waived key Russia-related sanctions and tariffs under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. Had the order gone the other way, goods arriving in the United States from major buyers of Russian crude oil and natural gas—including India and China—faced secondary tariffs of up to 100 percent on top of existing duties.

For importers, refiners, and diplomats watching the clock, it was a massive breather. Yet calling this a permanent truce would be a mistake.

How the 100 Percent Tariff Threat Came Together

Congress passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 with overwhelming bipartisan backing, and Trump signed it into law on September 18, 2026. Lawmakers wanted teeth. After years of watching Moscow route crude through shadow tankers and third-country middlemen, Capitol Hill wrote a law designed to hit both Russia and the biggest buyers keeping Russian energy revenues flowing.

Under the law's structure, duties on Russian goods could climb as high as 500 percent. Even more disruptive for global commerce, Section 113 targeted major third-country importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas—as well as countries facilitating sanctions evasion on Russian oil—with tariffs of up to 100 percent across goods exported to the U.S. Most of those Russia-related rules carried a 30-day implementation window that expired on October 18, 2026.

Anyone who tracks customs compliance knows how terrifying a blanket threat like that looks on paper. Even if an importer doesn't touch Russian oil directly, a broad tariff rule on all imports from a major trading partner forces supply chain managers into emergency triage overnight. Still, as legal analysts at Holland & Knight and Sullivan & Cromwell noted, the statute gave the president real discretion to waive those provisions when certifying that doing so served U.S. national interests.

Energy Math Beats Moral Outrage in Washington

Why sign a sweeping sanctions bill in September and then hollow out its core tariffs in October? Follow the barrels.

Global energy markets in autumn 2026 were already strained by Middle East conflict, including the war involving Iran and disruptions around shipping lanes. Tight diesel supplies and high fuel costs were hurting consumers and industrial transport alike, creating political pressure ahead of the November 3, 2026 U.S. midterm elections.

Earlier in October, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License No. 135 to allow certain Russian diesel transactions for six months through April 2027, following a deal Trump announced with Russian President Vladimir Putin aimed at boosting global diesel supply. Slapping 100 percent tariffs on India and China—two of the biggest buyers of Russian energy—would have risked driving energy prices even higher and snarling supply chains at the worst possible moment.

I've watched enough trade fights to know this pattern well. Sanctions look clean in congressional hearings. In the real world, refineries run on specific crude grades, tankers take weeks to reroute, and voters notice fuel prices at the pump immediately. When policymakers have to choose between maximum economic punishment on Moscow and keeping energy flowing without another price shock, practical self-interest usually wins.

What This Means for India and China

For New Delhi and Beijing, the waiver didn't solve every trade friction, but it removed an acute nightmare. According to trade data and market estimates cited in recent coverage, China and India remain top buyers of Russian fossil fuels—with China purchasing roughly 10.7 billion euros in Russian fossil fuels in October 2026 and India ranking second at around 4.1 billion euros.

India's position is especially delicate. Indian refineries have relied heavily on Russian crude while West Asian oil supplies faced disruption from the Iran war, and swapping crude grades isn't as simple as flipping a switch. Heavy crude, sour crude, light crude—each refinery configuration is tuned to specific feedstocks, and blending alternatives takes time and money.

Even with the waiver, businesses trading with India or China shouldn't treat Washington's trade posture as settled. Existing duties and separate trade disputes still apply, and the waiver doesn't erase the underlying statute. As Cleary Gottlieb highlighted in its analysis of the October order and subsequent Russian countermeasures, the legal architecture remains active even when specific provisions are suspended.

Not everyone in Washington cheered. Senator Richard Blumenthal—who co-drafted the original Russia sanctions push with the late Senator Lindsey Graham—blasted the waiver on X, arguing it undercut national security and rewarded Putin.

Friction has also spilled into domestic U.S. politics and state-level enforcement. Following the October diesel license, New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill challenged the move in a November letter, arguing that allowing Russian diesel imports conflicts with Congress's earlier 2022 ban on importing Russian oil and energy products and warning terminal operators of potential legal exposure. And just this week, on November 19, 2026, The Guardian reported on a joint peace declaration among Trump, Xi Jinping, and Putin at the APEC summit that sidestepped the Ukraine and Iran wars—showing just how tangled great-power diplomacy has become.

Let's be honest about what all this signals. A presidential waiver isn't a repeal. Because the Graham Act's tariff authorities sit on the books, a future White House—or even the current administration if diplomatic talks stall or energy markets shift—could revisit those restrictions later. Also worth noting: the law's separate extension of the Iran Sanctions Act through 2031 isn't covered by the Russia waiver authority, which means compliance teams dealing with Iran exposure still face strict rules.

Practical Steps for Importers and Analysts Right Now

Don't celebrate too early, and don't panic either. A smart compliance posture sits right in the middle:

  1. Audit origin and supply chain documentation. Make sure your bill-of-materials tracking and country-of-origin records are clean for goods sourced from India, China, or third countries that refine or blend Russian feedstocks.
  2. Build tariff-shock clauses into commercial contracts. If you're negotiating multi-month supply agreements, specify how sudden tariff changes or regulatory shifts get handled so one side isn't blindsided.
  3. Track USTR reviews and executive actions. The Graham Act requires ongoing trade reviews and monitoring of Russian energy flows. Watch for formal determinations rather than relying on rumors or cable clips.
  4. Separate Russia relief from Iran and legacy bans. Keep Russia-related waivers distinct from Iran sanctions compliance and existing statutory bans on direct Russian energy imports.

Trade policy in 2026 moves fast, and waivers can vanish just as quickly as threats appear. Keeping your supply chain flexible is the only real insurance policy.

LC

Lin Cole

With a passion for uncovering the truth, Lin Cole has spent years reporting on complex issues across business, technology, and global affairs.